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WERE STANDARD OIL'S REBATES AND
DRAWBACKS COST JUSTIFIED?
DANIEL A. CRANE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Standard Oil's preferential railroad rebate structure lies at the heart of
the seminal Standard Oil case, which culminated in the Supreme Court's
1911 affirmation that Standard Oil had violated the Sherman Act and
should be broken up.1 Beginning in 1868, Standard Oil received rebates of
varying amounts from railroads for crude and refined oil shipped east over
their lines. In some later years, it also received drawbacks for oil shipped
by independent refiners-Standard Oil's competitors. The rebates and
drawbacks gave Standard Oil a competitive advantage over their rivals and
accounted for a large part of the reason that John D. Rockefeller obtained
such dominance in oil refining and distribution.
The muckraking journalist Ida Tarbell made Standard Oil's
discriminatory rebates a central feature of her crusade against the
Rockefeller interests.2 The government also made the rebates a central
point of its case,3 and the Supreme Court affirmed their illegality.
Thereafter, the Interstate Commerce Commission effectively ended the
legality of such rebates as a regulatory matter.
From the beginning, however, pro-Standard Oil voices have argued
that, far from exhibiting a rapacious strategy to destroy rivals, the rebates
and drawbacks were simply a reflection of Standard Oil's superior
efficiency. In this story, Standard Oil was able to exact rebates and
drawbacks from the railroads because it was able to pass along
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
2. See IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (1904).
3. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 42 (describing government's charges of "[r]ebates,
preferences, and other discriminatory practises [sic] in favor of the combination by railroad
companies").
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extraordinary efficiencies to the railroads. In short, the claim is that the
rebates and drawbacks were cost justified. The cost justification claim has
gained momentum in the past few decades, particularly with its adoption in
Ron Chernow's 1998 bestselling biography of Rockefeller.4
In this essay, written for a symposium on the centennial anniversary of
the Supreme Court's Standard Oil decision, I reexamine the cost-
justification question. In the first part, I explain why the cost-justification
question is central to the entire case and its acquired and evolving historical
meaning. In the second part, I review the evidence of claimed efficiencies
passed on to the railroads. I conclude that there is evidence that Standard
Oil passed along significant cost savings to the railroads and that these
savings could have justified a portion of the rebates and drawbacks.
However, I conclude that there is little or no evidence that the rebates were
proportional to the magnitude of the savings-which is the critical
question. Moreover, elements in the structure and timing of the rebates and
drawbacks seem more consistent with a story of exclusion than with cost
justification.
II. WHY THE COST-JUSTIFICATION QUESTION MATTERS
The issue of the rebates' cost justification is foundational to a number
of critical ways in which we think about the law and economics of the
Standard Oil litigation.5
First, and most simply, the cost-justification question is important
because the rebates and drawbacks are central to the narrative of the case.
The rebates and drawbacks were allegedly a primary means by which
Standard Oil acquired dominance over its rivals.6 If the railroads granted
the rebates and drawbacks simply as a concession reflecting the cost
savings Standard Oil passed on to them, then it is difficult to understand
why their receipt by Standard Oil should give rise to antitrust liability.
Further, if the rebates and drawbacks were cost justified, their secrecy
should not create any reason to consider them nefarious. There are many
legitimate economic reasons for preserving secrecy about and within
4. See RON CHERNow, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. (1998).
5. See D. Daniel Sokol, The Strategic Use of Public and Private Litigation in Antitrust as
Business Strategy, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 689, 707-20 (2012) (studying the private litigation against
Standard Oil).
6. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 42.
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contracts.' This is particularly true of price-discriminatory contracts, whose
revelation to other clients of the vendor could force the vendor to lower its
prices to others and, over time, erode the entire price discrimination
scheme.
Second, since the rebates were attacked as unlawful because they
violated the railroads' common carrier obligations of nondiscrimination, it
is useful to ponder whether they were cost justified. It was at least arguable
that the late nineteenth-century common law permitted railroads to offer
volume-based and cost-based discounts.' Further, it was generally unlawful
at common law for a railroad to grant discriminatory rebates, but not for a
shipper to receive them.9 If the rebates were lawful at common law, then
their use as a predicate act of exclusion for Sherman Act purposes is
questionable. The framers of the Sherman Act insisted that, substantively,
they were enacting the common law.' 0 In early cases like Trans-Missouri,"1
the Supreme Court held that Sherman Act liability might attach even to
agreements lawful at common law, but it later retreated somewhat and tried
to harmonize its reading of the Sherman Act with the common law.12
Indeed, the Supreme Court's Standard Oil decision was perhaps most
notable-and controversial-for relying heavily on English and American
common law and adopting the common law's rule of reason into Sherman
Act jurisprudence." The rebates' cost justification is thus significant in
7. See generally Omri Ben-Shabar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109
YALE L.J. 1885 (2000) (arguing that revealing secret contract terms might weaken a party's bargaining
position in future contract negotiations and also might allow other contracting parties that learn the
previously secret information to hold up performance of existing contracts to demand new and more
favorable terms).
8. AMBROSE PAlt WINSTON, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY 14-15
(1908).
9. Brief for Appellants, Vol. 1, at 201-02, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)
(No. 398). Indeed, the Interstate Commerce Act generally did not impose liability on shippers that
received discriminatory rates until the Elkins Act amendments in 1903. See CHERNOW, supra note 4, at
116.
10. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 20
(1978).
11. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 328 (1897) ("A contract may
be in restraint of trade and still be valid at common law.").
12. See, e.g., Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 237-38 (1899)
(explaining that a contract held illegal under the Sherman Act would also have been illegal under
common law). For a discussion of the rule of reason, see Andrew 1. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature
and Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (2012)
(reviewing the history of the rule of reason since Standard Oil); Alan J. Meese, Standard Oil as
Lochner's Trojan Horse, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 783 (2012) (studying the constitutional origins of the rule
of reason).
13. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 50-51 (explaining importance of common law in interpreting
the Sherman Act). On the controversy surrounding the Supreme Court's adoption of the common law's
5612012]
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understanding the degree to which the Supreme Court's Sherman Act
jurisprudence departed from or remained faithful to the Sherman Act's
common law moorings.
Third, the rebates and drawbacks are important predicate issues to the
predatory-pricing issues and their subsequent legacy in controversy around
predatory-pricing law.' 4 Many of the accounting issues surrounding the
predatory-pricing claims and the meaning of "cost" in the oil distribution
context are affected by the inclusion or exclusion of Standard Oil's rebates
from the cost calculus. For example, including the drawbacks on other
firms' shipments as a legitimate reduction in Standard Oil's distribution
cost, on the theory that the drawbacks were a remittance in consideration of
Standard Oil's reduction of the railroad's costs, almost certainly means that
most challenged sales were not below cost. On the other hand, if the
drawbacks were illegitimate side payments in consideration of Standard
Oil's role as cartel ringmaster, then they should not be allowed as
reductions in Standard Oil's cost basis for purposes of analyzing the
predatory-pricing claims.
Finally, if the rebates and drawbacks were cost justified, then there is
less reason to look for nefarious reasons-literally, conspiracy theories-
that the railroads would have extended such significant price cuts. Ida
Tarbell asserted, with scant support, that Standard Oil "bribed" railroad
executives into giving rebates.'" With much greater support, Elizabeth
Granitz and Ben Klein have argued that Standard Oil was able to
monopolize petroleum distribution by serving as a cartel ringmaster for the
three principal railways and collusively stabilizing the railways' market
shares by shifting its shipments between lines to maintain the agreed-upon
market shares.16
If, however, the rebates and drawbacks were cost justified, conspiracy
rule of reason in Standard Oil, see WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 265-70 (1965).
14. See generally Christopher R. Leslie, Revisiting the Revisionist History of Standard Oil, 85 S.
CAL. L. REv. 573 (2012).
15. TARBELL, supra note 2, at 227 ("It was to get rid of competition that the oil-carrying
railroads were bullied or persuaded or bribed into unjust discrimination."). For further discussion of the
ringmaster theory, see Benjamin Klein, The "Hub-and-Spoke" Conspiracy that Created the Standard
Oil Monopoly, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 459 (2012); George L. Priest, Rethinking the Economic Basis of the
Standard Oil Refining Monopoly: Dominance Against Competing Cartels, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 499
(2012).
16. Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin Klein, Monopolization by "Raising Rivals' Costs": The
Standard Oil Case, 39 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1996).
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theories become less necessary to the story. A New York Times editorial
from August 11, 1906, asks:
Can it be possible that the Standard Oil had something to give for the
rebate, and that this explains why the rebate was given to Standard Oil
instead of to its competitors, who had not the inducement to offer in the
way of volume of traffic in exchange for the rebate which induced the
shipper to route his traffic in the manner profitable to both parties to the
transaction? This idea of mutuality in the transaction is slow in making
its way into the public mind, but it is important to an appreciation of the
nature of the act. The idea that the railways rebated just as burglars steal,
from pure criminality and without the element of an exchange of
equivalents, should be abandoned.17
Moreover, under simple economic assumptions, Standard Oil, as a
customer of the railroads, should have preferred competition among the
railroads to collusion, and the railroads, as Standard Oil's suppliers, should
have preferred not to deal with a monopsony customer. But each side might
have tolerated, indeed enabled, the other side's acquisition of market power
given an acceptable quid pro quo. The cost-justification question thus lies
at the center of the broader question of whether we should regard the
Standard Oil episode as an instance of unilateral exclusionary conduct or a
complex web of conspiracies to monopolize and cartelize a number of
vertically related economic activities.' 8
III. WERE THEY COST JUSTIFIED?
A. REBATES
The cost-justification theory was asserted early in the academic
skirmishing over the Standard Oil case. While the prosecution was still
ongoing, Ambrose Winston wrote a tract in which he argued that the
railroads gave rebates for essentially two reasons.19 First, Standard Oil
made oil shipments that were both more regular and in considerably higher
volumes than other oil companies. 20 This increased regularity and volume
supposedly created huge savings for the railroads. Winston cited an
example of the Lake Shore Railroad whose executives claimed that, prior
to their deal with Standard Oil, the average time for a freight car round trip
from Cleveland to New York was thirty days, but if the railroad could
17. The Standard Oil Rebates, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1906.
18. See generally Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The Antitrust Curse of Bigness, 85
S. CAL. L. REv. 605 (2012) (discussing the size obsession in antitrust tradition).
19. WINSTON, supra note 8, at 12.
20. Id.
2012] 563
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secure sixty oil cars per day it could reduce the round trip to ten days by
moving in solid trains instead of mixing oil cars in other trains.21 This
would supposedly reduce the railroad company's investment from
$900,000 to $300,000.22
Second, Winston claimed that Standard Oil saved the railroads money
by taking over functions previously performed by the railroads. In some
cases, Standard Oil contractually relieved the railroads of all risk of
liability for fires or other accidents. 23 In other cases, Standard Oil furnished
its own tank cars, stations, and switches, and took over all of the loading
and unloading functions. 24 Winston concluded that "the low rate in these
cases is due to services performed by Standard Oil (loading, etc.) not
ordinarily performed by shippers." 25
In his biography of John D. Rockefeller, Ron Chernow extended
Winston's cost-justification claims. According to Chernow, Rockefeller
and Henry Flagler "didn't simply try to squeeze the railroads-they were
much too shrewd and subtle for that-but offered compelling incentives."26
In addition to assuming liability for accidents, Standard Oil committed to
Lake Shore to stop using water transport during summer months. 27 in
addition, Rockefeller and Flagler committed to ship sixty carloads of
refined oil a day. Since Standard Oil lacked that capacity on its own, it
coordinated with other Cleveland refiners to secure the sixty carloads.28
Further, "Rockefeller's firm invested heavily in warehouses, terminals,
loading platforms, and other railroad facilities so that the railroads probably
derived more profit from his shipments than from those of rivals who paid
higher rates." 29 For Chernow, the Lake Shore deal showed the benefits to
the railroads of dealing with a monopsony customer: "From [the moment of
the Lake Shore deal], the railroads acquired a vested interest in the creation
of a gigantic oil monopoly that would lower their costs, boost their profits,
and generally simplify their lives." 30
Although it seems clear that the rebates reflected some cost savings to
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 12-13.
25. WINSTON, supra note 8, at 13.
26. CHERNOW, supra note 4, at 113.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 116.
30. Id at 113.
564 [Vol. 85:559
HeinOnline  -- 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 564 2011-2012
STANDARD OIL'S REBA TES AND DRA WBA CKS
the railroads, the historical record does not support a conclusion that they
were fully cost justified. A variety of factors call the cost-justification story
into doubt.
First, none of the advocates of the cost-justification position have
attempted to show that the rebates were proportionate to the railroads' cost
savings. Although one need not-and should not-demand the stringency
of modem, forensic-accounting-intensive Robinson-Patman Act cost
justification,31 proof that Standard Oil saved the railroads some money is
surely insufficient to prove that the rebates were cost justified. At a
minimum, the historical record is devoid of evidence tending to show that
the rebates were structured proportionately to any cost savings, and this
leaves open the possibility that some portion of the rebates and drawbacks
were compensation to Standard Oil for performing the cartel ringmaster
function.
Second, Standard Oil's own briefs did not pursue a cost-justification
argument. As set forth above, such an argument would likely have been
available to Standard Oil to the extent that it pursued a common law
justification for its conduct-a tactic that Standard Oil did pursue on other
issues. But instead of showing that the rebates were cost justified, Standard
Oil largely focused on proving that the rebates were unexceptionable and
not illegal prior to the passage of the Hepburn amendments to the Interstate
Commerce Act in 1906.32 Thus, for example, Standard Oil emphasized the
indubitable fact that freight "schedule rates were merely nominal" and that
no one paid full price.33 Standard repeatedly stressed that its rivals were
offered the same deals that Standard was offered. Although that argument
may help to show the absence of discrimination, it tends to undermine any
efficiency arguments, since it concedes that Standard Oil was not
exceptionally situated.
Third, as Granitz and Klein have argued, "If Standard's rate advantage
was purely cost based, Rockefeller would not have had actively to prevent
the railroads from offering discounts from agreed-upon railroad rates to
independent refiners." 35 Even if Standard Oil was initially able to secure its
31. See Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55 EMORY
L.J. 423, 469-70 (2006) (explaining that courts have required stringent evidence of proportionality
between savings and discounts in order to establish cost justification defense under Robinson-Patman
Act); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 347 (1985) (explaining that
the cost-justification defense "has been so narrowly construed that it is almost impossible to use").
32. See Anti-Pass Acts, 34 Stat. 584 (1906).
33. Brief for Appellants, supra note 9, Vol. II, at 56.
34. Id.
35. Granitz & Klein, supra note 16, at 41.
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rebates through superior efficiency, it labored hard to ensure that its rivals
could not enjoy similar prices even if they were able to achieve similar
level of efficiency.
Finally, the most dramatic effect of the rebate and drawback
agreements came from rebates and drawbacks that were never actually
implemented: those organized under the South Improvement Contract in
1871-1872. South Improvement was a venture of the major railroads to
offer extraordinary price concessions to one major refiner in each of the
four major refining centers. To illustrate, from a nominal price of $2.00 per
barrel, each South Improvement refiner was to receive a rebate of $0.50 on
its own oil shipments and an additional equal rebate on any oil shipped by
an independent refiner. In return, each refiner would agree to act as an
"evener" for the railroads, allocating its shipments among the railroads in
proportion to the railroads' mutually agreed market share formula.36
In its defense, Standard Oil asserted that such allocation agreements
were quite burdensome, since they required Standard Oil to shift its
distribution routes to accommodate the railroads' allocation scheme rather
than Standard Oil's own preferences. Rockefeller testified, for example,
that the allocation agreements often required Standard Oil to ship oil to
Philadelphia when it would have preferred to ship to New York.37
But if the allocation schemes were a net burden to Standard Oil, it is
difficult to understand their effect on Standard Oil's Cleveland refiner
rivals, which quickly began to sell out to Standard Oil once the South
Improvement scheme became known." Standard Oil's protests on this
score seem weak. First, it protested that the South Improvement scheme
never went into effect and therefore could not have driven the refiners out
of the market.39 Second, it protested that the timing of events disproves the
notion that the South Improvement deal caused the independents to sell out
to Standard Oil, noting that "[t]he purchase of some of these, and
negotiations for the purchase of others, took place in the last part of 1871
[whereas] [i]t was not until January 18, 1872, that the South Improvement
Contract was signed."40
36. Id. at 9.
37. Brief for Appellants, supra note 9, Vol. II, at 53.
38. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 32 (reporting that in the 1871 to 1872 timeframe, Standard Oil
"acquired substantially all but three or four of the thirty-five or forty oil refineries located in Cleveland,
Ohio").
39. Brief for Appellants, supra note 9, Vol. II, at 44.
40. Id
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The flaw in this these arguments is that Rockefeller did not need to
have operational contracts, or even consummated contracts, to convince the
independents that they were about to be crushed by a rebate-and-drawback
scheme that they could not possibly match. Although the South
Improvement contract was not signed until 1872, all of the business terms
had been finalized in late 187 1.41 Rumor of the impending South
Improvement deal preceded its execution, and its devastating effect on
independents' morale and business prospects was complete before the Oil
War in March 1872 led to the demise of the South Improvement scheme.
We are left, then, with the fact that the independents in Cleveland
realized their doom upon learning of the rebate-and-drawback scheme: they
realized that no matter how hard they tried to realize their own efficiencies,
they would not be able to match Standard Oil's distribution costs. This
alone does not disprove the cost-justification account, since it is possible
that the South Improvement deal was simply the final piece of evidence of
Standard Oil's superior efficiency necessary to convince the independents
that they could not compete with Rockefeller's superior mousetrap.
However, that possibility seems to be undermined by the fact that
Rockefeller touted the fact of the rebate-and-drawback provisions, rather
than his own superior efficiency, as the reason that the independents should
sell out.42 Since the refiners were in the same business and the same
geographic market as Rockefeller, they did not need the railroads'
affirmation of Standard Oil's superior efficiency to believe that they could
no longer compete. That Rockefeller used the fact of his contractual
triumph with the railroads as leverage in twisting the independents' arms
undermines the cost-justification account.
B. DRAWBACKS
Acknowledging that drawbacks "seem to be a different story" from
rebates, Michael Reksulak and William Shughart nonetheless justify the
drawbacks as pass-ons of cost savings generated by Standard Oil's superior
efficiency. 43 First, "by helping to reduce the average cost of rail
transportation . . . , Rockefeller conferred a positive externality on his
rivals, reducing the railroads' average cost of handling their shipments as
well. Drawbacks were a way for the railroads to share those gains with the
41. Granitz & Klein, supra note 16, at 14.
42. Id at 15.
43. Michael Reksulak & William F. Shughart II, Of Rebates and Drawbacks: The Standard Oil
(NJ.) Company and the Railroads, 38 REV. IND. ORGAN, 267, 280-81 (2011).
2012] 567
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company that was responsible for them."" Second, Reksulak and Shughart
hypothesize that the drawbacks were a means of preventing competitors
from using Standard Oil's secret prices as bargaining leverage with the
railroads:
[G]iven that it was common practice for all shippers to exploit a rebate
that had been granted by one railroad to 'shop around' for an even larger
discount off the published tariff from another, drawbacks plausibly also
had the advantage of being more difficult for competitors to discover
and use as bargaining leverage. 45
As with the rebates, it is plausible that the drawbacks reflected some
efficiency advantage. However, the claim that the drawbacks were merely a
pro rata recoupment by Standard Oil of the efficiency benefits it passed
onto the railroads is questionable, at best. Something other than efficiency
seems necessary to account for the drawbacks' structure.
In assessing the efficiency defense as to the drawbacks, it is useful to
break down the kinds of efficiencies Standard Oil may have passed on to
the railroads into two pools-volume-based efficiencies and service-based
efficiencies. Volume-based efficiencies would be those arising from
Standard Oil guaranteeing the railroads a large volume of oil shipments.
Such efficiencies would not reduce the railroads' fixed or variable costs but
would allow them to defray their fixed costs-largely, the costs of laying
trackage-across a greater revenue base. Service-based efficiencies would
be those arising from Standard Oil undertaking various transportation
functions or costs-such as insurance and warehousing-that the railroads
would otherwise have had to undertake or incur themselves. These services
would largely reduce the railroads' marginal costs of transportation,
although they could also reduce fixed costs by obviating the need for the
railroads to invest in terminal infrastructure.
It seems unlikely that volume-based efficiencies can explain the
drawbacks. As noted above, Standard Oil began to secure rebates and
drawbacks years before it had sufficient volume on its own to justify them
and had to consolidate shipments with other refiners in order to meet its
guaranteed volumes. Its much-vaunted guarantee to Lake Shore of sixty
carloads a day was only secured by coordinating volume among Standard
Oil shipments and oil from other Cleveland refiners. Standard Oil may
deserve some credit for organizing the guarantees, but cannot claim full
44. Id at 280.
45. Id.
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credit for the volume because much of it was supplied by others. Once
Standard Oil had bought out most of its rival Cleveland refiners in 1872, it
of course could guarantee the railroads much larger and more stable
volumes. In light of the fact that it used its South Improvement rates as
leverage to buy out its rivals, though, it hardly seems appropriate to credit
its post-1872 volume as evidence of volume-based efficiencies as reasons
for Standard Oil's drawbacks.
In trying to assess the economic functions of the drawbacks, Standard
Oil itself gives us relatively little aid. In its briefs, Standard Oil spent far
more time denying that drawbacks were given or that they were Standard
Oil's fault than justifying their existence. Thus, for example, Standard Oil's
Supreme Court brief emphasizes that the South Improvement contract was
not Standard Oil's idea, that Rockefeller actively disapproved of it and only
agreed to sign up under compulsion, and that it never went into effect.46 As
to evidence that some of the freight paid by West & Sons had found its way
into Standard Oil's coffers, Standard Oil dismissed the evidence as hearsay
and argued that it "should be barred as a narrative of past facts made after
the alleged conspiracy had come to an end."
Nowhere does Standard Oil embrace the possibility that its drawbacks
were justified by its superior volume, which reduced the average cost of
transporting its rivals' oil. Instead, where the company admitted to the
existence of drawbacks, it sought to justify them as service based. Alas, the
narrative here seems suspect as well.
In its briefs, Standard Oil acknowledged that it received some
drawbacks-or, at least what others referred to as drawbacks. It
nonetheless sought to justify these as fees paid by the railroads for a
warehousing service. Thus, Rockefeller testified: "We were handling these
large quantities of oil. We were warehousemen. We were natural parties to
take these warehouses and handle them. It was in our regular business of
the receiving and shipping of the oil .... That was a special sort of a
service, for which we were eminently fitted."' If Standard Oil was
providing a warehousing service for its competitors' oil, it was only natural
that it should be paid for the service.
46. Brief for Appellants, supra note 9, Vol. 11, at 43 (asserting that none of the promoters of
South Improvement "were connected with the Standard Oil Co."); id at 44 (asserting that "Mr.
Rockefeller and his friends did not believe in the [South Improvement] plan, but were unwilling to
antagonize its promoters, especially Mr. Scott of the Pennsylvania, who was then potent in railroad
circles"); id. (asserting that "[n]o oil was ever hauled under the contract").
47. Id at 58.
48. Id. at 47.
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However, if Standard Oil was providing its competitors a warehousing
service, then why did its fee come through a secret rebate from the
railroads rather than a direct charge to the firm offered the service? The
answer implicitly given by Standard was that it was customary for the
railroad to provide warehousing services and to incorporate those charges
as part of its freight bill. Ordinarily, the fee for warehousing would be
buried within the freight rate. But, occasionally, a railroad investing in new
warehouse infrastructure would exact an itemized warehousing surcharge.
Standard provided the example of the Erie Railroad, which, during a period
of intensive investment in warehouse infrastructure and simultaneous fierce
competition on freight rates, enacted a five-cent surcharge on every barrel
of oil passing through its yards to cover warehousing expenses.49
Standard Oil then contrasted the Erie situation with that of New York
Central, which "owned no terminals for receiving oils, and these were
furnished by [Standard Oil], which had to be reimbursed, not merely for its
services as warehouseman, but for the use of its premises."50 Hence,
explained Standard Oil, it was natural and logical for Standard Oil to
charge New York Central a fee for its warehousing of independent refiners'
oil. The railroad was to remit eighteen cents a barrel expressly for
warehousing services-the marginal costs of processing the independents'
oil. It was also to remit ten percent of the rivals' freight.5 ' This, Standard
Oil explained, reflected Standard Oil's investment in "real estate and
equipment," effectively its recoupment of a portion of its fixed cost
infrastructure enjoyed by the independents when they accessed Standard
Oil's warehouses. 52
While it is plausible that some portion of the drawback was meant to
cover Standard Oil's warehousing expenses, there are two incongruities in
the story that raise doubts as to whether the New York Central drawback
was simply the remittance of an expense covered by Standard Oil. First,
observe that the service or marginal cost component was set at a fixed
rate-eighteen cents a barrel. But the fixed-cost component-what
Standard Oil described as its recoupment of its sunk investment in real
estate and equipment-was paid back as a percentage of the freight rate.
This second portion of the drawback was thus invariant to the degree to
which the shipper took advantage of Standard Oil's warehouses. A longer
49. Id at 46.
50. Id (emphasis omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id.
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journey would presumably yield a higher remittance to Standard Oil than a
shorter journey, but the length of the journey after leaving or coming to the
warehouse would bear no relation to the amount of Standard Oil warehouse
infrastructure "consumed." For example, if an independent's oil traveled
400 miles on the railroad's tracks and stayed in the warehouse for one day,
Standard Oil would be owed a higher remittance than if it traveled 300
miles but stayed in the warehouse for two days, even though there would
be more utilization of Standard Oil's infrastructure in the second case.
Standard Oil was thus metering its warehousing infrastructure recoupment
fee on a factor that bore little relation to the amount of warehousing
resources the independent consumed.
This would not be particularly troubling if Standard Oil had become
the railroads' joint-venture partner in operating a transportation service and
thus expected to share in risks and rewards. But a second element of the
New York Central arrangement calls a risk-and-profit-sharing joint venture
into doubt. The ten percent "royalty" remitted to Standard Oil was not
based on the freight rate paid by the independent but on the rate charged by
New York Central to Standard Oil for shipment over the same line.53 That
rate was apparently the nominal rate (i.e., the rate before the payments of
any rebates), which was generally above the market rate. The effect of this
rebate structure was to ensure that Standard Oil received a generous slice of
the independents' freight and to discourage the railroad from offering
independents secret discounts, which would simply have increased the
percentage of the independents' shipping charges recouped by Standard
Oil.
In light of these facts, it seems that the drawbacks may have served
two functions. As with the rebates, a portion of the drawbacks may have
served to compensate Standard Oil for legitimately provided services. At
the same time, the drawback structure suggests that Standard Oil may have
used its role as a warehouseman as a pretext for imposing on its rivals a
hidden tax that would ensure that they could never match Standard Oil's
distribution costs. In that case, the drawbacks story would illustrate the
raising-rivals'-costs story now familiar in the economic literature.
IV. CONCLUSION
As best as one can tell from a fairly causal inspection conducted well
over a century after most of the relevant events transpired, the answer to
53. Id (explaining that the remitted sum "should be equal to 10 per cent of the freight due the
railroad from the Standard Oil Co. upon oil transported for it over said railroad").
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the question, "Were Standard Oil's rebates and drawbacks cost justified?"
is both yes and no. Yes, Standard Oil created efficiencies for the railroads
for which it deserved a reduction in rates and, to some extent,
compensation drawn from its rivals' rates. But, no, cost justification falls
short as a complete explanation for the rebates and drawbacks. On balance,
the need to find some additional-and likely nefarious-explanation seems
compelling.
This is not necessarily to say that the courts were right to condemn the
rebates and drawbacks, that the muckrakers' shrill attacks on any form of
secret rebating are well taken, or that the Interstate Commerce
Commission's eventual insistence on strict rate equality was desirable.
Joseph Schumpeter may have been correct in describing Rockefeller's
rebates and other aggressive dealings as necessary to sweep away the
conventional property rights standing in the path of capitalism's gales of
creative destruction.54 Standard Oil may have won a good deal of the battle
through superior efficiency in a variety of ways, and society may have been
better off because of it. But pure cost justification does not provide a
complete or convincing account for the rebates and drawbacks.
54. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 89 (1942) ("Even the
conquest of financial control over competing concerns in otherwise unassailable positions or the
securing of advantages that run counter to the public's sense of fair play-railroad rebates-move, as
far as long-run effects on total output alone are envisaged, into a different light; they may be methods
for removing obstacles that the institution of private property puts in the path of progress.").
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